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Abstract 
Arguments for the importance of contextual factors in understanding human 
performance have been made extremely persuasive in the context of the process 
control industries.  This paper puts these arguments into the context of the train 
driving task, drawing on an extensive analysis of driver performance with the 
Automatic Warning System (AWS). The paper summarises a number of constructs 
from applied psychological research which are thought to be important in 
understanding train driver performance.  A “Situational Model” is offered as a 
framework for investigating driver performance.  The model emphasises the 
importance of understanding the state of driver cognition at a specific time (“Now”) in 
a specific situation and a specific context. 
Introduction 
The work reported in this paper was carried out as part of a study for the Rail Safety 
and Standards Board (RSSB).  The aim was to understand and assess the risks of 
driver unreliability associated with extended uses of the Automatic Warning System 
(AWS) on the UK rail network.  The study is summarized in references 1 and 2.   
Despite what, to all everyday experience, appears to be an extremely powerful 
attention-getting device, combined with a highly visible visual reminder, there is a 
significant, and recurring risk of AWS failing to prevent experienced train drivers 
passing signals at danger.  According to Vaughan (3), "No-one ever thought that the 
driver would ignore the warning.  It was utterly taken for granted that a driver would 
always take notice of the signal. (p.12).   In connection with the crash at Watford 
Junction in 1996, Hall (4) wrote that; "It seems inconceivable that a driver can 
acknowledge receiving two warnings and yet take no action to apply the brake to stop 
the train at the red signal, yet it happens".  (p.97) 
Although relatively straightforward conceptually, the ways in which AWS is used in 
the UK introduce a number of complexities for the driver. These reflect the 
complexity and variability of UK signalling, as well as the various ways AWS is used.  
These include; 
∆ AWS does not adequately discriminate between the possible states giving rise to 
the alarm.  The system therefore depends on the driver having an adequate 
appreciation of the existing situation to be able to correctly interpret the alarm. 
∆ There are a variety of situations where the sunflower can refer not to the 
immediate past signal, but to a signal some time prior to that.   
∆ The time frame of AWS activity (i.e. the time period over which any AWS signal 
is ‘active’ in terms of conveying information about the track ahead) can vary from 
a few seconds to possibly many minutes.   
Train driver performance is dominated by cognitive and perceptual factors.  Much of 
the existing human factors research in the area draws on relatively simple models of 
human decision making and information processing.   Traditional, hierarchically-
based forms of task analysis are at the core of much of this research.  From the 
perspective of cognitive psychology and cognitive engineering, these approaches are 
held to be fundamentally flawed.   Specifically, they are not able to capture the 
contextual and situated nature of human performance in general, and train driver 
performance in particular.    
Vicente (5) offers a compelling critique of traditional approaches to Task Analysis.  
Similarly, Hollnagel (6) provides a detailed critique of human reliability estimation 
techniques from the perspective of cognitive engineering.  The arguments made by 
both Vicente and Hollnagel are extremely well made, and may be considered 
definitive.  There are doubts about whether the techniques they propose overcome 
these limitations (Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) in the case of Vicente and the 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) in the case of 
Hollnagel),or whether they will translate from a process control context to train 
driving.  Nevertheless, we believe that many of the limitations and weaknesses of 
traditional forms of task analysis and human reliability estimation they identify are 
equally valid for understanding train driver performance.   
Other than in the sense of identifying factors likely to influence or shape performance 
little if any of the existing research has tried to understand the mechanisms by which 
contextual and situational factors influence driver performance.  The relative 
simplicity of the psychological basis of the existing work, and the persistence of 
SPAD incidents, suggests that more comprehensive insights are needed. 
Recent thinking in the psychology of real-world human performance 
There is now a large, established and well respected body of thinking and research that 
focuses on understanding human cognition and performance in the real world contexts 
in which it occurs.  Recognising the psychological complexity of the AWS problem, a 
number of ideas from this wider knowledge-base were reviewed.  These go beyond 
the immediate literature on human factors aspects of AWS.  The aim was to introduce 
a number of areas of thinking about cognitive performance in real world tasks that 
seemed relevant to understanding the risks associated with train drivers use of AWS.    
The following sections very briefly introduce some of these areas.  A more detailed 
review, with full reference list, is available in (7). 
Strategic behaviour:  The importance of strategy and strategic behaviour in human 
performance has been recognized, at least in the research literature, for many years.  
In particular, strategy is essential in helping the human maintain performance in 
situations of stress, very high or very low workload or when subject to other 
influences.  The concept has however rarely been used explicitly to try to understand 
or explain human behaviour and performance in real-world situations.  Recent 
research by Merat, et al. (8) into train driver eye movements provides contemporary 
insights into strategic behaviour in train drivers. 
Situation awareness:  Situation awareness is possibly the most widely cited construct 
in understanding human performance in complex real-time systems.  Not surprisingly, 
it is also considered a key psychological construct in safe train driving. 
Loss of situation awareness leads to what Sarter and Woods (9) have described as 
automation “surprises”.  In connection with the Purley rail crash in 1989, Vaughan (3) 
describes “Driver Morgan of the Littlehampton train [..] completely at a loss to 
understand what had happened” (p. 91).  Vaughan notes that driver Morgan must 
have acknowledged and cancelled the two previous AWS warnings leading up to the 
red signal, but failed to initiate an appropriate braking maneuver until it was too late.  
A number of factors can potentially interact to determine the train driver’s 
understanding or belief about the current situation and therefore how an AWS alarm is 
interpreted.  These include; the nature of the alarm (bell or horn); visibility of signals 
and magnets on the track ahead; the driver’s interpretation of the nature of the 
preceding alarm; expectations about the current location (from route knowledge, as 
well as WONS, PONS and Late Notices); the train speed to be achieved, and by what 
time or by what location it is to be achieved. 
Changes in any of the factors can potentially lead to a change in the driver’s 
interpretation of a particular AWS alarm.  In combination, they have the potential to 
cause the driver to misinterpret what an AWS alarm refers to, and what action to take.  
Situated behaviour:  The term 'situated behaviour' refers to a broad group of areas of 
psychological thinking.  They all seek to take the understanding of human 
performance out of the laboratory context, and to ground it in the real-world 
environment in which it occurs.  The common themes are that the context and 
particularly the situation at the time, have an extremely powerful influence on how the 
human performs in real world tasks.  
The work of Rasmussen, Pedersen and Goodstein (10), Vicente (5) and many others 
on the analysis of cognitive work1 takes the view that it is not possible to understand 
human performance without locating it within organizational and technological 
constraints.  They demonstrate why traditional normative analysis approaches are not 
well suited to understanding complex socio-technical systems because they under-
                                                 
1 Note that this approach is concerned with the analysis of cognitive work: it is not cognitive task analysis. 
estimate (if they capture them at all), the context dependent aspects of human 
performance. 
Distributed cognition:  Ecological-based research such as Ed Hutchins’s ground-
breaking 'Cognition in the Wild' (11) and much of the varied research into Distributed 
Cognition emphasises the critical role that the situation and environment play in 
cognitive performance.  The Distributed Cognition concept recognises that cognitive 
performance draws on, and is supported by, many artefacts of the organisation and 
surrounding environment.  
It is, for example, clear that the placement of a prominent AWS magnet in the middle 
of the track can help to cue the driver in advance of a warning sounding.   The driver 
is also likely to take advantage of many other environmental cues.  These might 
include TPWS antennas, hot axle box detectors, other incidental AWS sounds (such 
as a relay’s clicking) and a myriad of other track/trackside artefacts. 
Cognitive control modes and subjectively available time:  Hollnagel (6) has 
developed a model of cognitive performance (COCOM) that recognises and seeks to 
account for the critical role of context in cognition.  His  ideas of cognitive control 
and subjectively available time seem potentially important in understanding train 
driver behaviour.  Route knowledge supports anticipation and future-orientated 
behaviour.  It allows the driver to think ahead, and helps control the allocation of 
cognitive and perceptual resources based on expectations about the future.  It also 
helps the driver in spotting and interpreting cues and other information.  In the 
COCOM framework, the effect of route knowledge might be to increase subjectively 
available time, thereby allowing the driver greater cognitive control over 
performance. Among the more important aspects of tactical behaviour is the (often 
unconscious) scheduling of visual attention, which switches the eyes to and from the 
different sources of information 
Ecological optics:  Following the lead of JJ Gibson (e.g. 12), there is a very large 
body of knowledge about the ways in which humans, as well as many other species, 
make use of information directly available from movement of the eyes of an observer 
in a visual field.  A sizeable body of this work has concentrated on how information 
directly (i.e. without requiring cognition) available from what is known as the 'optic 
flow' is used to control the timing and co-ordination of movement through the world.  
The information is derived directly from pattern and motion perception, and guides 
action without the need for thought, calculation, or conscious decision-making.  This 
model of the visual control of movement has been shown to apply to many areas, 
including walking, running, driving cars, and flight (both by humans and birds). 
From the perspective of ecological perception, the train driver is in a relatively unique 
and paradoxical situation.  Seated at the front of a fast moving vehicle, the driver is on 
the one hand enclosed in an extremely powerful and compelling optic flow.  But, 
apart from very few situations (such as approaching buffers), the information that 
their senses would normally draw on to control movement is of no relevance to their 
driving task.  The driver has no control over directional movement, and control of 
speed is entirely mediated by cognitive processes such as perception of signs, and 
route knowledge.  Whether and how the driver balances the (cognitive) use of the 
speedometer and the (direct) use of the optic flow in estimating train speed is not 
known. 
The implications - if any - of this paradoxical situation for driver performance and 
reliability are not known, and, so far as we are aware, have never been investigated 
explicitly. It is however possible that it could, for example, contribute to the 'driving 
without attention’ phenomenon (discussed below).   
Attention:  There are at least two quite distinct meanings of the word ‘attention’ that 
are relevant to the study of train driver performance.  Both have been intensively 
investigated for many years in laboratory and practical situations. 
The first is often called ‘vigilance’, and is typical of ‘watch-keeping’ tasks, where an 
observer tries to detect signals that arrive at infrequent intervals during which nothing 
much happens.  Often the vigilance decrement can be avoided by an occasional 
message to the observer that requires an answer.  The experimental Pro-Active AWS 
system (18) provided a means to achieve this in requiring, effectively, an ‘answer’ 
from the driver as to the signal aspect that was approaching.  The vigilance decrement 
is also dependent on the extent of trust that the driver has in AWS.  The occurrence of 
a string of frequent signals that do not require a response may also cause the vigilance 
decrement to increase.    
The second meaning of attention is in “dynamic selective attention”. In real situations, 
particularly in the case of vision (though also in hearing), attention tends to be 
directed to one source of information at a time.  To some extent attention can be 
shared between two or more tasks, although performance will usually be degraded.   
It is interesting that although evidence given to the Southall Inquiry maintained that 
drivers would always be looking at signals before the AWS sounded,  in their study of 
driver eye movements Meret et al. (8) found that on a significant proportion of signals 
the contrary was true.  As predicted by quantitative attention models, attention was 
elsewhere and was attracted by the sound of the AWS.   
Driving without attention:  There is considerable interest in psychological research 
and among safety professionals in the concepts of ‘driving without attention’ 
(DWAM), and ‘looking-without-seeing’.  These notions may have relevance to the 
AWS context, although no specific literature related to train driving has been 
identified.   
Allen (13) wrote that, “In modern multi-aspect signalling there is a tendency to 
shorten the signal sections. […]  When traffic is dense through multi-aspect territory, 
a train will often come upon a quick succession of double or single yellow aspects.  At 
every one the driver will get an AWS warning, which he has to cancel.  In such 
conditions, the risk of frequent canceling action degenerating into a reflex action that 
loses its full meaning for the driver is a real one” (p. 332).   
In their extensive review of human factors in road traffic safety, Dewar and Olsen 
(14) consider the possible reasons for the large number of driving accidents associated 
with car driver inattention, “highway hypnosis” and “DWAM”.  They refer to the 
state as being associated with monotonous, uneventful driving, where a lack of 
novelty promotes automatic responses.  
Expectancy:  One of the key benefits of route knowledge is that it allows the driver to 
prepare in advance for the route ahead.  With good route knowledge, the driver is able 
to plan ahead, to prepare for events before they occur, and to quickly understand and 
interpret information.  That is, it generates expectancy.  In the great majority of 
situations, expectancy and the ability to plan ahead is effective; indeed, without it, it 
would not be possible for humans to perform many of the complex tasks they manage.  
On occasions, however, expectancy can lead to pre-planned behaviours being 
inappropriate, or can lead to incorrect interpretation of information.   
Trust in automation:  A growing body of research has been investigating the role 
that trust and confidence in technology plays in influencing the way people interact 
with technology-based systems. 
If a system is regarded as untrustworthy then it will tend not to be used correctly.  
Likewise, if an unreliable system is trusted then it will tend to be used even though it 
malfunctions.  Despite the importance of trust in technology, it remains relatively ill-
defined and only partly understood psychologically.   
The dynamics of trust in technology have been dealt with by Lee and Moray (15) and 
Parasuraman and Riley (19) among others in connection with supervisory control and 
automated systems.  They define the dynamics of trust around predictability, 
dependability and faith.  In simplistic terms, trust is established by consistent and 
desirable behaviour.  This relies on the observability of system behaviour, as well as 
the individual actively sampling it.  As trust is gained, the focus shifts away from 
observing specific behaviours towards assessing the global disposition of the device 
(it is said to be “dependable”).  Over time, trust serves to reduce the effort expended 
in checking the system to ensure it is performing as expected.    
In our questionnaire survey of 277 drivers conducted as part of the AWS study (1), a 
substantial proportion reported issues suggesting drivers know they cannot always 
trust an AWS warning. 
Simple heuristics and recognition-primed decision making:  Perhaps most 
intriguing, is recent work by Gigerenzer and Todd on what they term 'Simple 
Heuristics' (16).   Gigerenzer and Todd take the view that complex human 
performance in the real world cannot possibly involve the rational cognitive strategies 
assumed by much experimental psychology.  Understanding decisions in the real 
world requires different, more psychologically plausible explanations. The work on 
simple heuristics focuses on what they term "fast and frugal heuristics - simple rules 
for making decisions with realistic mental resources".   
The notion of simple heuristics is similar to the well-established concept of 
recognition-primed decision making (see for example, Klein 1989, 2003). Instead of 
emphasising heuristics and rules, Klein’s model of decision making is bound in the 
ability of humans to pattern match.  Repeated experiences are unconsciously linked 
together to form a pattern. Links between features in past and current situations enable 
typical features of situations to be extracted, and typical responses generated (Klein, 
1989). This model is similar to the well-known GEMS model of human error (17).  
Whether or not 'simple heuristics' and/or ‘recognition-primed decisions’ are important 
in determining train driver performance remains to be seen.  It might seem surprising 
if, in some form, they were not. 
Summary of psychological thinking 
So how does consideration of these wide variety of psychological constructs help in 
understanding train driver performance?   Two general observations seem relevant. 
The first is that, however desperately the human factors professional might seek tools 
and analysis methods that can be applied systematically across application domains, 
the fact is that the basis of human performance is exceedingly complex.  Generic 
information processing ‘models’ of the human operator can certainly provide 
extremely useful generalizations.  They have value in systems engineering, and in 
seeking to predict asymptotic limits of human performance in complex systems.  Even 
relatively simple models can have great value as engineering tools in providing 
structure and drawing attention to human capabilities.  
However, as a means of understanding why specific individuals, on a particular day in 
a particular set of circumstances behaved (or failed to behave) in a particular way, or 
predicting how an individual might behave in a given set of unexpected 
circumstances, such models have very little to offer. 
The second general observation is that if such an understanding of what happened in 
an incident, or what is likely to happen, is important, it is essential to identify and 
understand the characteristics of the context and situation at the time the behaviour of 
interest occurred or is expected to occur.   
A Situational Model of driver performance with AWS 
A principle conclusion of the study, then was that driver performance with AWS can 
only be understood in terms of the context and situation at the time the system is 
intended to influence driver behaviour.  From this perspective, existing approaches to 
modeling driver performance appear relatively superficial. Developing a 
comprehensive model of the psychology of driver behaviour would be a significant 
task.  However, based on the material reviewed, and drawing on insight from 
discussion with drivers, a tentative framework that might underpin the assessment of 
risk associated with Extended AWS was developed. 
The objective was to provide a framework to help understand the possible state of 
cognition of a particular driver between the point at which the AWS signal is detected 
and the driver’s subsequent behaviour.  The emphasis on time reflects the fact that 
many of the circumstances and situational factors involved are inherently time-
dependent, or time-limited.  These include: 
∆ The role of time in controlling the safe passage of a train (such as the time for 
which signals are visible, and the time involved in accelerating or braking) 
∆ Events or features which are only true at particular locations on a track 
∆ Expectations or beliefs a driver might hold because of the way in which events 
have evolved over time prior to an event (due to the spatial relationship between 
signals and speed restrictions, say, or because of the relative speed and distance 
between trains further down the track) 
Figure 1 illustrates a “Situational Model” of driver behaviour.  A number of points of 
introduction are needed to put this framework into context: 
∆ The Situational Model has been developed as a framework to direct attention 
towards those situational factors which seem to be important in understanding 
driver behaviour. 
∆ The model emphasises the state of cognition at a specific time (“Now”) in a 
specific situation and a specific context.  The emphasis is therefore on the 
immediate situation facing the driver, and the immediately preceding history 
(what is shown on the framework as “The Now”).  Longer term knowledge and 
experience is clearly important.  However, the emphasis is on understanding the 
behaviour of a particular individual at a particular moment. 
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Figure 1: Situational model of driver performance in interacting with AWS 
∆ The situational model is aligned against a standard information processing model 
(Perceive-Decide-Act) of human performance.  This seeks to contextualise the 
model of the human as an information processor in terms of the situational factors 
that determine actual performance in a real-world, real-time, environment.  This 
emphasises that any analysis of driver performance using an Information 
Processing model needs to take proper account of situational issues.   
∆ The model can be no more than a ‘snapshot’.  Details of what matters at any 
moment, and how factors interact will vary over time, particularly as the ‘state’ of 
the driver changes.  For example, different states of attention and cognitive control 
could be particularly powerful in mediating how elements of the framework might 
interact at any time.  Momentary distractions might also disrupt interactions 
between elements of the framework.   
Briefly, the framework incorporates the following assumptions (each of these is 
represented as an element on the figure); 
∆ driver performance is based on a foundation of knowledge and experience derived 
over a relatively long time from training and general experience.  As well as 
explicit knowledge of the rules, procedures, and disciplines governing 
professional driving, this knowledge base includes recent experience of the route 
being driven (e.g. the next signal has been at caution on every approach over the 
past fortnight).  It will also include such things as the typical false alarm rate 
associated with AWS signals. 
∆ the driver has a mental representation of the current state of the world as it affects 
the current driving activity.   This includes elements such as the current speed 
limit, state of the track (are track side workers in the vicinity) and significant 
features in the route over a psychologically relevant timescale ahead.  It will also 
hold awareness of the immediate history (the last six caution signals have cleared 
before the train reached them because of a queue of trains ahead).   Much of this 
world model will be held sub-consciously. 
∆ two elements are particularly important in determining the driver’s cognitive state 
at any specific moment (“Now”).  These are the immediate priority and the 
expectation of what the world will be like in the next few moments.  The 
immediate priority might be to reduce speed, or to ensure every individual in a 
track-side party can be seen. Expectation might include the location of the next 
signal, the point at which a speed limit will come into force, the expectation that 
an unsuppressed AWS magnet is about to cause an alarm that can be ignored, or 
the expectancy that the signal will change it’s state while its still in view. 
∆ both immediate priorities and expectations are continually changing and updating 
as the train progresses along the route. 
∆ The driver directs attentional resources based on current priorities and 
expectations.  Responses to events in the outside world are determined by a 
driving strategy which can vary from moment-to-moment, within reasonably 
broad constraints.  The nature of the driving strategy, and especially how they 
vary, will depend extent on the drivers training, experience and confidence. 
We have found that the situational model of driver behaviour provided an extremely 
useful framework for assessing the risk of driver unreliability with AWS.  
Consideration of the model led to eighteen situational factors being identified which 
might influence the drivers state of cognition at the time AWS warnings are 
encountered (i.e. “Now” on the model).  These eighteen factors provided the basis for 
an assessment of the likely risk associated with twenty scenarios involving encounters 
with AWS (see 1 for a summary of the assessment. 
Summary  
The study reported in this paper sought to understand the nature of driver reliability 
with the Automatic Warning System, and to estimate the likely change in driver 
reliability if the use of AWS is further extended. Considerations from the 
psychological research base identified a reasonably large number of mechanisms and 
constructs that might be important in understanding moment-to-moment driver 
performance.  Most important among these appear to be: 
∆ the importance of expectancy and route knowledge 
∆ the drivers mental representation of the situation and how the understanding of 
immediate priorities and objectives are maintained and controlled 
∆ trust in the system, specifically, the extent to which drivers’ experience might 
cause them to expect a certain level of ‘false’ alarms or incorrect signals.   
Both the situational model of driver behaviour, and the method used to assess driver 
reliability with AWS might have wider application in understanding safety issues 
associated with driver performance.  
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